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Although Iran :s' nuclear programme can be traced back to the 1950s,
and a US-supplied research reactor went online at
the Teheran Nuclear Research Center (TNRCj at the end of the 1960s,
it was only after the oil crisis in 1973 that the Shah began to invest heavily in nuclear energy.
In the following years, Iran concluded contracts with the United States (1974),
Germany (1976j and France (1977) for the construction of power reactors and supply
of fuel for them. It bought itself into the Eurodif gaseous diffusion enrichment
plant in France and the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia, acquired yellowcake
from South Africa and sent technicians abroad for training in nuclear sciences.
The scientists at TNRC were given wide discretion regarding the nature
and orientation of the nuclear research to be conducted
Spurred by the influx of oil revenues, the stated goal was to generate
23000 MWefrom nuclear power stations.
Key words: Nuclear programme, Iran
1. Introduction
Under a contract with Siemens (PR Germany),
two light water reactors (LWRs) were built at the
Persian Gulf city of Bushehr, each with a capacity
of 1200 MWe. They were due to be operational in
1980. but the construction works came to an abrupt
halt with the revolution in 1979. Ayatollah Khomeini
took no personal interest in nuclear matters, I and
many Iranian nuclear scientists left the country. Also,
declining oil revenues and insufficient electrical in-
frastructure made the suppliers reluctant to proceed.
Did the Shah have in mind to develop a nu-
clear weapon capability under the umbrella of the
NPT, wrapped in a civilian power programme? Iran
signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it in 1970, the
year it entered into force.
The founder and head of the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) up to 1979, Akbar
Etemad, says the Shah took no interest in military
applications.' Western intelligence agencies have not
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been convinced about that, however. Even if Etemad 's
claim was correct for the Shah and his closest col-
laborators, this might not be the whole story. Iranian
research teams may have pursued scientifically inter-
esting avenues of relevance for weapons acquisition
on their own initiative, especially since they were so
generously funded and broadly mandated. This is well
known from the nuclear programmes of other coun-
tries: with or without the knowledge of their political
superiors, scientists have conducted activities of di-
rect relevance for weapons production.
With the passage of time, and in relation to a
regime that has been relegated to history, evidence
about nuclear weapon ambitions could be expected
to pop up. This has not happened. The secrecy sur-
rounding such intentions makes it hard to prove them,
especially since there is no need to make formal de-
cisions about weapons objectives a long time in ad-
vance: preparations for the production of nuclear
weapons can be made in reference to a variety of
other purposes. As long as there is no need to pass
any reference to weapons at any level of government,
there may simply be no documents to leak .
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Whatever the intent, what was done in the
1970s came to use later when Iran resumed a more
vigorous nuclear programme in the mid-1980s. At
Bushehr, one of the light water reactors is rebuilt by
Russia and scheduled to be operational in 2007. En-
richment contracts with foreign companies, first en-
tered into in 1975, were followed up upon in the 80s
and 90s. In response to an IAEA inquiry, Iran ex-
plained that a recent attempt to purchase hot cell
manipulators and lead glass windows for reprocess-
ing of spent fuel was based on design information
provided by a foreign supplier in the 1970s.3 Gener-
ally, it can be assumed that the supplier network of
the 1970s was helpful in starting the clandestine pro-
gramme ten years later.
Ever since the NPT came into being, it has
been acknowledged that states may come close to
nuclear weapon status while observing the provisions
of the Treaty and the associated safeguards agree-
ments with the IAEA. Naturally, the revelation of 18
years of concealed fuel cycle activity, and of an un-
derground supplier network nurtured from within a
nuclear weapon state (NWS), took the Iranian case
to the top of the non-proliferation agenda.
2. Concealment
In the summer of 2002, the National Council
of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) identified two previ-
ously unknown facilities: a uranium enrichment plant
at Natanz and a heavy water production plant at Arak.
Shortly thereafter, Iran announced that it was devel-
oping a nuclear power programme that relied solely
on indigenous resources.' This information triggered
intensified IAEA inspections and hectic diplomatic
activities to clarify the full scope of Iran's nuclear
programme.
In 1985, Iran made a decision to pursue enrich-
ment technologies. In 1987, it acquired drawings ofa
P-l centrifuge and samples of centrifuge components
from the Qadeer Khan network.' Centrifuge REcD
testing began at TNRC in 1988 and continued at
Kalaye Electric from 1995 on." Between 1994 and
1996, Iran received another set of drawings for the p-
I design along with components for 500 centrifuges.
At about the same time, it also received design draw-
ings for a P-2 centrifuge through the same network.
The P-2 rotors are based on maraging steel and can
work at twice the speed of Pvlrotors, which are made
of aluminium. Hexafluoride was fed into a centrifuge
at Kalaye Electric for the first time in 1999, and then
into a cascade of 19 centrifuges in 2002.7
It is the enrichment programme that raises the
greatest proliferation concerns. Iran's ability to pro-
duce weapons-grade plutonium is more distant. Up
to 2003, work on both tracks was kept secret, in vio-
lation of the safeguards agreement. As listed in the
Director General's report to the Board of Governors
of November 2004 and summarized in his report of
September 2005, Iran has failed over an extended
period of time to report on important transactions
and activities; to declare the existence of important
facilities; to provide design information; and, on
many occasions, to cooperate to facilitate the imple-
mentation of safeguards." Between February and
October 2003, as the IAEA began to track clandes-
tine activities down. Iran took a number of steps to
conceal the origin, source and extent of its enrich-
ment programme and other nuclear activities."
Subsequent to a request by the Board of Gov-
ernors of September 2003 for a " ...full declaration
of all imported material and components relevant to
the enrichment programme ..."IO, Iran informed the
Director General that a decision had been taken to
provide the Agency with a full disclosure of Iran's
past and present nuclear activities. On 21 October,
2003, it provided what it described as a full picture
of its nuclear activities. In a number of respects, the
new story was much different from the story that had
been conveyed to the IAEA the previous month. The
reorientation was part of a deal brokered by Britain,
France and Germany (EU3), in which Iran also
agreed to a time-limited suspension of its uranium
enrichment programme. The IAEA was asked to
monitor the suspension.
It rarely happens that a government declares
itself guilty - from one month to the other; in one
wholesale admission - of having conducted a com-
prehensive disinformation campaign. In the ration-
ality and ethics of the Western world, this is deplor-
able. In Muslim societies it is not necessarily so.
Resort to misleading information may be appropri-
ate in order to get out of difficult and dangerous situ-
ations. Especially in Shia culture, efforts to extri-
cate oneselffrom pressing problems by creating con-
fusion among the infidels may be legitimate. II
Was the October decision a radical turn away
from concealment and disinformation to full and ac-
curate information about the nuclear programme?
Admitting the need for confidence building in view
of the concealment practices of the past, the Iranian
government signed an additional safeguards protocol
based on the model protocol outlined in INFCIRC 540,
and undertook to act as if it was in force." Accord-
ingly, it declared a number of nuclear-related activi-
ties that had not been under the Agency's purview
and gave the Agency expanded inspection rights. One
and a half years later, all declared nuclear material
had been accounted for. To date, nothing has been di-
verted to prohibited activities. However, the Agency
is not in a position to conclude that there are no unde-
clared nuclear materials and activities in Iran. Since
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February 2006, when the IAEA reported Iran to the.
UN Security Council and Iran withdrew from the
Additional Protocol in protest, the Agency has been
unable to make further progress in this regard."
The Additional Protocol was developed in re-
sponse to the Agency's failure to detect the clandes-
tine programme in Iraq in the 1980s. By casting the
net beyond nuclear materials to also include activi-
ties related to such materials, and by providing
stronger inspection rights, the Protocol gives the
Agency a better chance to detect undeclared projects.
It has scored some successes already, inter alia by
making the nuclear history of South Korea more
transparent." Iran is a more demanding case, how-
ever. Even under normal circumstances, determin-
ing whether everything has been declared is a time-
consuming process; it took 5 years in Japan and 31/
2 years in Canada. In view of Iran's past pattern of
concealment, making a full and accurate account of
its nuclear history is particularly demanding.
What is the proper approach to the Iranian
challenge? Governments answer this question dif-
ferently because there is no uniform understanding
of what is going on in Iran, and because they pursue
different objectives there.
3. Interpreting the Iranian
Challenge: Four Scenarios
Reliable information about the programme is
first and foremost the data collected by the IAEA.
The accuracy of information provided by national
intelligence agencies, and of political statements
made in reference to national intelligence, is hard to
assess because of the secrecy of the collection proc-
ess." So far, however, national intelligence has hardly
added much to the information collected by the
IAEA. No "smoking gun" has been found.
The IAEA secretariat is restrained by its own
evidence and must stick to its neutral monitoring and
verification function, It examines Iran's technological
procurement efforts and does not engage in public
speculations about Iranian motives. Governmental ex-
perts, on the other hand, have to calibrate Iran's inten-
tions as best they can when formulating their policies.
To get a better understanding of what the data
mean, they should be interpreted in the light ofvari-
ous assumptions about the nature and objectives of
the Iranian programme. Four scenarios may be of
particular interest:
(1) Iran is building a comprehensive indig-
enous programme for peaceful utilization of nuclear
encrgy. Very much of what we know - about the ura-
nium cycle in particular - is intemally consistent and
in conformity with such a reading. Some critical
questions remain unresolved, however. One of them
concems the need for a natural uranium/heavy wa-
ter reactor of the size now being built at Arak (40
MWt). This is the same kind of reactor that India
used to make plutonium for its first nuclear explo-
sion in 1974,16and that Israel acquired in the early
1960s.17 To produce isotopes for medical and agri-
cultural uses, a smaller reactor would arguably do.
Another question concerns the economics of
the programme. For a country so richly endowed with
oil and gas to go for nuclear energy was not seen as
a commercially viable proposition. Not until recently:
on the basis of today's petroleum prices, and the like-
lihood that prices will stay high or become even
higher in the future, the calculations look much dif-
ferent. Also, nuclear power has become more eco-
nomical because the safety improvements after
Chemobyl produced spin-offs in terms of lower op-
erating costs. IS Sceptics emphasize, however, that the
recent sharp increases in petroleum prices could not
have been foreseen at the time major decisions about
the Iranian nuclear programme were made.
Third, while Iran underlines the importance
of self sufficiency and therefore insists on building
complete indigenous fuel cycles, its uranium depos-
its appear too small to sustain a power programme
of the projected size (7000 MWe). However, the ura-
nium market has been a buyer's market for long, so
self sufficiency in most If not all other respects would
go a long way towards real energy independence.
Today, all major powers are competing for oil and
gas worldwide. At the beginning of this century and
for a long time ahead; geopolitics is first of all about
energy supplies and energy security. For Iran, the
combination of oil, gas and nuclear power can se-
cure high export incomes as well as a high degree of
energy independence.
Finally, why such an effort to conceal the pro-
gramme in violation of international commitments?
Iran says concealment was necessary because an open
programme would have run into US sanctions. In view
of the adversarial relationship between these coun-
tries since the days of the hostage crisis, this would
very likely have been the case. When Iran decided to
pursue the uranium enrichment route, the war with
Iraq was still going on, and the US and other Western
powers supported Iraq. However, this does not neces-
sarily explain Iranian motives at the time. The US,
European states and others assert that Iran's exten-
sive concealment left a confidence deficit that can only
be removed by elimination of all fuel cycle elements.
(2) Iran went for nuclear weapons under the
umbrella ofthe NPT and tries to keep the programme
on course as best it can. As indicated above, this ap-
proach may not have been alien to some of the Shah's
men either. NPT membership and IAEA safeguards
shed legitimacy on Iran as a non-nuclear weapon state
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(NNWS), in lieu of which a secret programme could
materialize - much the way Iraq pursued nuclear weap-
ons in the 1980s following the Israeli bombing of
Osiraq in 1981.19 Iraq was a member of the NPT, and
a safeguards agreement was in force.
The clandestine programme went uninter-
rupted until 2002, when the NRCI triggered a crack
in the secrecy. When the IAEA followed up, Iran
took evasive action for most of 2003, but turned
around to cooperate much better with the Agency
from October that year. Much better, but not fully:
in this scenario, Iran does not disclose more than
strictly speaking necessary, just enough not to be
caught in another act of cheating. True to its nuclear
weapon ambition it tries to rescue as much as possi-
ble and therefore balks at full disclosure. After nearly
three years of intensive investigations, the IAEA re-
mains unable to paint the full picture.
If "smoking guns" exist - which is an under-
lying assumption here - what is the likelihood that
the Agency can find them? A "smoking gun" is some-
thing which can only be explained as preparations
for weapons; such as work on warhead designs, trig-
ger mechanisms for nuclear bombs or missile elec-
tronics to deliver nuclear warheads. Here, the Agency
is in a bind; for it has no clear mandate to reach out
for them. For instance, it has no right to demand ac-
cess to military sites unless there is some indication
that nuclear-related activities are or have been go-
ing on there. Naturally, a sovereign government will
not accept international inspections at any military
site for fear that important national defence infor-
mation may end up with its adversaries and under-
mine its security." The Iranian government has strong
reasons to be concerned about that since the United
States openly refers to the possibility of using force.
Bombing raids to destroy the nuclear programme in
Iran may extend, say, to the infrastructure ofthe revo-
lutionary guard (the Pasdaran), so information about
military sites may help shape the target lists.
Among the outstanding issues are the use or
non-use of P-2 centrifuge technology, the documen-
tation being too thin for comfort; the existence in
Iran of a IS-pages document describing the proce-
dures for the reduction ofUF6 to uranium metal and
the casting and machining of it into hemispheres,
i.e. into a form suitable for weapons; and allegations
concerning the so-called Green Salt project" , high
explosives testing and design of missile re-entry ve-
hicles. The findings about the origin of enriched ura-
nium contamination tend to support Iran's statements,
yet some questions remain."
Given all the concealment efforts over so many
years, the Agency may never be able to reconstruct
Iran's nuclear history and verify the correctness and
completeness of Iran's statements unless Teheran
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offers transparency beyond the formal requirements
of the safeguards agreement and the Additional Pro-
tocol. For a while, it did so, a little by little. How-
ever, when in mid-200S the IAEA asked for better
access to individuals, documentation relating to pro-
curement, dual-use equipment, certain military-
owned workshops and research and development
locations, Iran found that request peculiar "now that
matters have neared total resolution", and expressed
doubts about the integrity of the IAEA.23Half a year
later, it ceased to implement the Additional Proto-
col, leaving the Agency hamstrung.
(3) When the programme was exposed, and
subsequent attempts at evasive action were unsuc-
cessful, Iran decided to become fully transparent
about everything involving fissile materials. but with-
out reveal in? any work on non-nuclear components
of nuclear ireapons. This was the decision commu-
1
nicated to the IAEA on 21 October 2003.
By that time, Iranian deceit and deception, and
I
the intense1international condemnation and scrutiny of
it through the IAEA, had surprised many Iranian deci-
sion-makers and embarrassed educated members oflra-
nian society. Many of them had not known about the
now-documented illicit activities and were concerned
that international reactions could hurt the economy se-
verely. Therefore, continuation of undeclared, illicit
activities was considered too risky. If detected, it would
damage Iran's reputation severely. Worse, it might iso-
late the country and bolster its enemies.
For years, the leadership had coped very well
with US sanctions, to the point of faring better with
than without them. Tightening of economic relations
with the European Union and others was quite an-
other matter, however. The compromise was there-
fore to leave aside whatever weapon ambition that
leading figures might have harboured; press ahead
with the fuel cycle programmes, the uranium enrich-
ment programme in particular; and become fully
transparent. 24
Transparency, with one important modifica-
tion: specific indications of past interest in nuclear
weapons would not be revealed. The regime would
be stupid to willingly hand over any "smoking gun",
that is, information about whatever research and de-
velopment of non-nuclear components of nuclear
weapon systems it may have undertaken, and which
the IAEA has no right to investigate anyhow. Since
it is bent on building a complete indigenous fuel cy-
cle and, thus, establish a technical option to produce
fissile material for weapons, the combination of past
pursuit of weapons and continued realization of a
weapons option - by the same regime - would trig-
ger stiff international reactions.
After more than two years of work based on
the Additional Protocol, voluntary transparency
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measures offered by Iran and leads submitted by
member states, no new undeclared facility or activ-
ity has been identified. Consistent with this scenario,
Iran may well have declared all its nuclear and nu-
clear-related activities. Given the relative ease with
which "smoking guns" can be hidden and the lim-
ited scope of the voluntary measures, whether or to
what extent work on non-nuclear components have
been going on remains an open question.
(4) Iran has pursued two programmes more or
less in parallel: a civilian programme and a separate
production line for weapons. Assuming that at some
point, the civilian programme would have to be de-
clared, Iran has built a separate production line for
nuclear weapons run by the military. Preferably, the
civilian line should have been declared on Iran's own
initiative, at the latest when indigenously produced
fuel would enter the first power reactor. Or, it would
have to be declared if exposed by others, as became
the case. The trick, then, would be to work with the
IAEA to establish that nothing had been diverted
from the civilian line to prohibited military uses, and
convince the Agency that it could and should rest its
case. The first part of this has happened, but the sec-
ond not.
In many ways, this is the most intriguing sce-
nario. Technological achievements in the civilian pro-
gramme have been at the disposal also of the mili-
tary production line, but as long as the existence of
that line has not been documented, no technology
transfers have been documented either. Without
known points of destination, such transfers are hard
to prove. No material was ever diverted: that was
part of the plan in order to have a real chance of
becoming "clean". More than once, Iran has urged
the IAEA to draw that conclusion.
If this is the way the Iranians have organized
themselves, they may be only a few unresolved ques-
tions away from success. One of them - about the P-
2 technology that it obtained in 1995 - is sticky, how-
ever. Iran says it has been fully occupied applying
the P-I technology and so did no work on the P-2
until 2002, when the design information was given
to a small firm in Teheran. This firm developed a
modified version so expeditiously that the IAEA
finds the story unrealistic unless it was assisted by
somebody else. The Agency therefore concludes that
"The reasons given by Iran for the apparent gap be-
tween 1995 and 2002 ... do not provide sufficient as-
surance that there were no related activities carried
out in that period ... "25
Israel appears convinced that there is a sepa-
rate, undetected military production line in Iran. The
United States also asserts that there are more unde-
tected facilities and activities there. Others are more
cautious, recalling the unfounded claims that West-
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em national intelligence agencies made about weap-
ons of mass destruction in Iraq prior to the war in
2003. US and British services, in particular, have
been discredited, casting doubts on their assessments
of other cases. Claims that go significantly beyond
IAEA reports are therefore met with caution and sus-
picion. All the more so since all the hints of unde-
clared activities that the US has communicated, and
the Agency has been able to check, have been proven
wrong.
Some of these scenarios are more likely to
capture Iranian realities than others. There is much
to suggest that Iran carries its nuclear programme as
far as it sees fit, the reactions of the outside world
taken into consideration. That is, had it not been for
external pressures it would have gone all the way to
nuclear weapons: Under the circumstances, a national
consensus has developed in support of the fuel cycle
programme as a technological prestige project, with
an in-built weapon capability. Seen this way, sce-
narios 2 and 3 stand out as the more realistic ones.
The United States holds that it has been a weapons
programme all the time, while others regard it as a
civilian programme with a military spin-off.
How realistic is scenario (4)? IfIran has a sepa-
rate military programme, why did it gamble to ac-
cept the AdditionalProtocol? They did not have to.
Only a minority of IAEA member states have ac-
ceded to the Protocol and the opposition to it in the
non-aligned movement, where Iran belongs, is
strong."
Ifit nevertheless made that gamble, and a sepa-
rate programme does exist, the problems it faces at
Esfahan and Natanz in making the UF6 pure enough
for effective enrichment, and in producing high num-
bers of well working centrifuges, make it unlikely
that there is a much more advanced programme else-
where. Therefore, in the worst of cases, there seems
to be ample time to continue the search for a politi-
cal solution to the problem.
4. Major Power
Objectives in Iran
Major power approaches to the Iranian chal-
lenge also depend on what these powers are trying to
achieve. The great majority of states want to prevent
Iran from becoming a NWS. All major powers share
that objective. However, they mix the non-prolifera-
tion objective with other national interests in ways
that differ from case to case. The United States is
working for regime change in Iran. China is careful
not to rub its petroleum cooperation with the Irani-
ans. Russia has significant arms sales to Iran, is build-
ing the first Iranian power reactor, and may get con-
tracts for many more. For China and Russia, Iran is
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important also in their efforts to thwart US global
ambitions. The European states are the ones giving
the highest priority to the non-proliferation objective.
Israel is less specific about regime change than
the US. but is keen to limit Iran's military strength
and reduce its capacity to hit at Israel. Decimating
Iran is an obvious Israeli national interest.
4.1. The United States
The updated version of the US National Se-
curity Strategy of March 2006 enhances the focus
on Iran as the next possible target of regime change.
The document has a preface signed by the President,
the first words of which are "America is at war". It
names seven tyrannical regimes: North Korea, Iran,
Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma and Zimbabwe. Two
of them arc singled because they continue to har-
bour terrorists at home and sponsor terrorist activity
abroad: Syria and Iran. One of them also tries to ac-
quire nuclear weapons: Iran. The concerns about Iran
arc much broader than that: "it threatens Israel, seeks
to thwart Middle East peace, disrupts democracy in
Iraq, and denies the aspirations of its people for free-
dom". The conclusion is that Iran presents the single
greatest threat to the United States."
Bombing is not a recipe for regime change,
however. On the contrary: when nations are under
threat, people usually mobilize in support of their
leaders. Domestic conflicts are set aside in defence
of a higher cause. So why does the US deem it vi-
tally important to take military action, if necessary,
to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons?
History is one part of it. The relationship be-
tween the United States and Iran is highly politicized
and deeply adversarial. The animosity towards the
ayatollahs is bipartisan. No country is more difficult
for the United States to engage diplomatically than
Iran. Insert Iran's nuclear programme into this
adversarial relationship and it has turned even more
confrontational - especially so since the programme
happened to surface in a fundamentally new inter-
national context driven by 9/11 and a much more
assertive US policy. Nobody in Iran - and nobody
else - could have envisaged that. It was a historical
coincidence of sorts.
Another part of the explanation is physical
control of oil supplies. One third of the world's oil
supplies flows through the Strait of Hormuz, and to
keep it flowing has been bedrock US foreign policy
for more than 50 years. Mossadeq was overthrown
partly because of an unseemly affinity to the Iranian
communist party (the Tudeh party), partly because
of his plans to nationalize the Iranian oil industry.
The Shah's unswerving commitment to the free flow
of Iranian oil became a central pillar of the Nixon
doctrine. In his final State of the Union address, Presi-
dent Carter declared that "Any attempt by any out-
side force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region
will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests
of the United States of America, and such as assault
will be repelled by any means necessary, including
military force"." The Reagan administration said the
same, and began establishing military bases in Saudi
Arabia. In 1990, when Saddam had occupied Ku-
wait, Secretary of Defence Cheney stated "We're
there because the fact of the matter is that part of the
world controls the world supply of oil, and whoever
controls the supply of oiI...will have a stranglehold
on the American economy .."29 Ifthose considerations
were not part of the reason for occupying Iraq, it
would have been the first time in more than half a
century that the uninterrupted flow of Gulf oil was
not a central element of US foreign policy.
Today, geopolitics is first of all about energy
supplies and energy security. The US has occupied
Iraq and keeps a military presence in Afghanistan;
has a number of bases in the Gulf region, including
new ones in Iraq to replace those that were lost in
Saudi Arabia; and deploys carrier groups in the vi-
cinity of the Gulf. It holds the region in a tight mili-
tary grip. A nuclear-armed Iran could question the
credibility of that military dominance, however. Even
if regime change is out of reach at this point in time,
it still makes sense to strike at Iran's nuclear pro-
gramme and limit Iran's ability to strike back.
A third part of it involves Israeli interests. Far
from recognizing Israel, the Iranian President says
he wants to wipe Israel off the map. To Israel, no
threat is greater than nuclear weapons in Iranian
hands. It is no surprise, therefore, that Israel goes by
worst-case readings of the Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme, claiming that Iran has a separate, secret
military programme not yet uncovered. It prepares
itself to take military action if nobody else (i.e. the
US) does. Israeli interests weigh heavily on US de-
cision-making. While the Democrats are not pro-
grammatically committed to regime change the way
the Republicans are, any US administration will do
its utmost to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear
weapon state. Non-proliferation and regime change
are difficult to reconcile. Policies of regime change
make serious negotiations impossible. If one party
makes it clear that his primary objective is to cut the
throat of the other, the other has little incentive to
negotiate. Furthermore, if one reads the Iranian pro-
gramme along the lines of scenarios 2-4, assuming a
weapons ambition, there is a dynamic escalatory el-
ement in US-Iranian relations similar to the relation-
ship between the US and North Korea: the US threat-
ens Iran; Iran pushes its nuclear programme with a
long-term view to keeping outside powers from die-
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tating and attacking it; and the US in turn uses this
to put additional pressure on the regime.
4.2. EU3
The E3/EU - France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the High Representative of the Euro-
pean Union - have sought a political solution within
the framework of the non-proliferation regime. Their
first attempt to keep Iran unambiguously non-nuclear
was part and parcel of Iran's reorientation of 21 Oc-
tober 2003: not only did Iran promise to cooperate
with the IAEA to become fully transparent, but on
that date it also signed the Teheran Agreed State-
ment with the E3/EU in which it undertook to sus-
pend sensitive fuel cycle works and negotiate a long-
term solution to the controversy. The scope of the
agreement turned out to be contentious, however,
particularly with regard to Iran's uranium conver-
sion facility at Esfahan. Iran continued work on this
facility, and eventually began to convert uranium
oxide into hexafluoride.
While these negotiations unravelled, the par-
ties signed another agreement in Paris on 15 Novem-
ber 2004, building on the Teheran agreement. In the
Paris agreement, suspension of all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities was agreed and specified
in unambiguous language." The IAEA was invited
to verify and monitor the suspension. The E3IEU
recognized that the suspension was a voluntary con-
fidence-building measure and not a legal obligation.
The long-term arrangement to be negotiated
on the basis of the Paris agreement should provide
"objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme
is exclusively for peaceful purposes". In return, Iran
would get "firm guarantees on nuclear, technologi-
cal and economic cooperation and firm commitments
on security issues"."
The parties never agreed on the operative
meaning of "objective guarantees". Iran emphasized
that compliance with the provisions of the NPT, full
transparency and application of the additional pro-
tocol is all that an NPT member can legitimately be
asked to accept." The E3/EU held that in view of
Iran's long record of concealment and non-compli-
ance with international obligations, the only way the
international community could be confident that Iran
is not determined to produce nuclear weapons was
for Iran to forego all enrichment and reprocessing
activities, for a period of time to be defined." How-
ever, on 1August, 2005, Iran announced that it would
restart its uranium conversion facility, and when the
E3/EU forwarded their offer to Iran a few days later,
outlining the contributions they would make if Iran
would abstain from fuel cycle activities, the offer
was summarily dismissed.
The Paris agreement reaffirmed the parties' com-
mitment to the NPT. However, the E3IEU emphasized
that exercise of the "inalienable right" to develop nu-
clear energy for peaceful purposes must be "in con-
formity with" art. I and II, and that there could be no
confidence that fuel cycle facilities on top of deceit and
deception would meet that requirement.
4.3. Russia
In the early days of his presidency, Vladimir
Putin worked to improve ties with China, India and
Iran while at the same time reaching out to Europe
and the United States. Moves in one direction were
offset by moves in another. After 9/11, Putin seized
the opportunity to forge a stronger partnership with
the Western world. In so doing, he changed the in-
ternational political agenda in such a way that in the
future, it became less likely that Russia would be
involved in humiliating disputes with the United
States and other Western powers. Throughout the
1990s, Russia had been the loser in several impor-
tant conflicts of interest." In effect, Putin recognized
the global political primacy of the United States and
realigned Russia with the new realities of power.
The United States has been leaning on Russia
to minimize its nuclear cooperation with Iran as a part
of a broader policy of sanctions, and of stopping arms
transfers to the ayatollahs in particular," For this rea-
son or for reasons of its own or both, Russia declined
Iranian demands in 1990 for a heavy water reactor,
and later turned down a request for gas centrifuges
which had been part of a deal made in 1995.36 The
Ycltsin government also rejected an invitation to as-
sist Iran in the mining of uranium. Similarly, the plans
to sell Russian laser enrichment technology were scut-
tled under US pressure in 2000.37
In the case ofBushehr, however, Russia made
it clear that it will finish the light water reactor un-
der construction there, and that it stands ready to
build five more power reactors over the next decade
at an estimated cost of$ 10 billion." The LIS, which
had been opposed to the entire Iranian nuclear pro-
gramme, was reluctant about the Bushehr reactor.
Its concern was not primarily about the handling of
the spent fuel: Russia would provide the fresh fuel
and take the spent fuel back." It had more to do with
the associated transfer of know-how and expertise:
By augmenting Iran's nuclear infrastructure and in-
volving thousands of Russian nuclear scientists, the
project would contribute indirectly to the weapon
programme. On its part, Russia stressed that Iran must
abide by its non-proliferation obligations and ratify
the additional safeguards protocol.
The US has also criticized Moscow for trans-
ferring missile technologies to Iran in violation of
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the MTCR agreement. At the Moscow/St. Petersburg
summit in 2002, this became a matter of dispute.
Putin refuted the claim and pledged that Russia's
cooperation with Iran was strictly in accordance with
its obligations under the international non-prolifera-
tion regime. He countered that Western companies,
not Russian entities. had furnished Iran with missile
and nuclear technologies."
While cooperating with the United States on
a variety of issues, especially after 9/11, nuclear co-
operation with Iran became a litmus test of the inde-
pendence of Russian foreign policy in the face of
US pressure. Hence, Russian-Iranian affairs got a
symbolic value in addition to their economic and
political importance. In recent years, the scope of
the cooperation has been clarified and restricted in a
way that makes it legitimate in the view of the E31
EU. Also in the future, Russia can be expected to
chart its own course on the Iranian nuclear issue, be
it in relation to the US or the EU or in multilateral
fora such as the IAEA Board of Governors and the
UN Security Council.
4.4. China
In 2004, China signed two agreements with
Iran for the import of altogether 360 million tons of
liquefied natural gas (LNG) over a period of25 years.
In addition to LNG, China will import 150 barrels
per day of crude oil over the same period. At the end
of2004, China became Iran's top oil export market.
Also, China has agreed to invest $100 billion in Iran's
energy sector over the coming 25 years. Next to Rus-
sia, Iran has become its most important foreign source
of petroleum. To secure continued high economic
growth, nothing is more important for China than
adequate energy supplies."
In some important respects, China, Russia and
Iran are political partners. China and Russia empha-
size that Sino-Russian relations have reached "un-
paralleled heights?", and Iran is an important part-
ner for both of them. Along with energy supplies,
arms transfers and investments, the triangle cultivates
compatible foreign policies. On important issues like
Taiwan and Chechnya they are holding identical
positions. China and Iran support Putin 's war against
the Cheehen separatists, and the recent promulga-
tion of China's anti-secession law, stating Beijing's
intolerance of Taiwanese independence in no uncer-
tain terms, was heartily commended in both Mos-
cow and Teheran. Another common denominator is
their opposition to US unilateralism.
The joint statement from the Russia-China
summit of October 2004 issued a strong rejection of
the Bush administration's unilateral foreign policy.
It noted that " ...it is urgently needed to (resolve) in-
ternational disputes under the chairing of the UN and
resolve crises on the basis of universally recognized
principles of international law. Any coercive action
should only be taken with the approval of the UN
Security Council and enforced under its supervi-
sion ...". The China-Iran-Russia triangle is Beijing's
and Moscow's way of countering US global ambi-
tions. Seen in this perspective, Iran is integral to the
broader effort to thwart the Bush administration's
foreign policy goals. For this and other reasons, China
and Russia oppose punitive action against Iran over
its nuclear programme.
China also has a history of nuclear assistance
to Iran that goes back to the mid-80s, when Iran re-
started its programme. It reportedly trained Iranian
nuclear technicians and engineers in China under a
ten-year agreement for cooperation signed in 1990.
It supplied Iran with two small research reactors in-
stalled at Esfahan, and provided an amount of UF4
and UF6 (hexafluoride)." Like Russia, it brought
some important nuclear transfers to a halt: the sales
of a plutonium-production research reactor and of
two 300 MWe power reactors were cancelled. The
cancellations may have been caused by a variety of
factors, however, not just US pressure." At the US-
China summit of October 1997, China undertook to
stop almost all its existing nuclear assistance to Iran
and not to enter any new agreements in this field.
The commitment included a pledge to terminate the
sale of a uranium conversion plant to Iran. In 2001,
the US concluded that China had lived up to the com-
mitment, but that Chinese missile assistance contin-
ued to pose a proliferation risk." However, neither
in the case of China nor Russia is there any hard
evidence to prove that they have been acting in vio-
lation of their MTCR commitments."
5. Conflicting Approaches
to the Problem
The major powers read the Iranian challenge
differently; they pursue different objectives in Iran;
and they therefore differ in their practical approaches
to the challenge.
The differences can be analysed along a
number of lines. In the most rudimentary of terms,
there is a dividing line between the E3/EU and the
US on the one hand, and Russia and China supported
by non-aligned states on the other. There are impor-
tant differences also between the E3/EU and the US.
5.1. E3/EU & US/Russia & China
The Western states assume that Iran has weap-
ons ambitions. The Europeans read the challenge
along the lines of scenarios 2 and 3 - scenario 2 mean-
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ing that Iran actively conducts a weapons programme
while scenario 3 leaves a weapon option that could
be realized on short notice at some later stage, some-
what similar to the situation in Japan. The US per-
ceives the problem along the lines of scenarios 2 and
4, assuming in both cases that there remain unde-
clared activities in Iran. Germany may have been
more cautious than other Western powers about im-
puting a weapons motive into Iranian behaviour.
Russia and China have been less explicit about
their understanding of the Iranian programme. They
appear more relaxed about its weapons potential - cer-
tainly more so than the United States - although Russia
has been leaning on Iran to go by the additional safe-
guards protocol and send spent reactor fuel of Russian
origin back to Russia. They have been acting as if sce-
nario 1 might be proven correct, and have pleaded for
the IAEA to be given sufficient time and all necessary
means to carry its investigations to an end.
Russia and China joined the other big powers
in calling on Iran to suspend all enrichment and re-
processing works and let the IAEA back in, full scale,
in order to facilitate a political solution. China may
be ready to normalize relations if and when the IAEA
concludes - however guardedly - that there are no
undeclared facilities or activities in Iran, and the
strongest safeguards provisions apply there. The
Chinese may agree with the Iranians that this would
amount to an objective guarantee of peaceful intent.
Russia may be leaning in the same direction. It is
unwavering in its commitment to Bushehr and fu-
ture power reactor deals, and the Russia-China-Iran
triangle strengthens its determination to go ahead.
However, as long as the IAEA is unable to conclude
on the Iranian file, this is a hypothetical question.
Many non-aligned states explicitly support the
Iranian claim that it has an "inalienable right" under
art. IV of the NPT to acquire fuel cycle facilities.
They object to US and other NWS attempts to re-
dress the fundamental trade-offs on which the NPT
is built, emphasizing non-proliferation at the expense
of disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
5.2. E3/EU/USA
Iran's response to the Framework for a Long-
Term Agreement offered by the E3/EU on 5 August,
2005 was stiff " ...the proposal is extremely long on
demands ... (and) absurdly short on offers to Iran ...
(and) amounts to an insult on the Iranian nation ..."47
At the core of the offer were assurances of
fuel supply for Iranian power reactors in return for a
halt to all fuel cycle activities in Iran. The proposal
elaborates on how the fuel supply can be assured in
practice, expressing support for the cooperation be-
tween Russia and Iran and committing the E3/EU to
assist in the establishment of a buffer store of fuel;
sufficient to maintain supplies at the contracted rate
for a period of 5 years. While international supply
arrangements can never be as reliable as domestic
sources of supply, and the buffer store would be lo-
cated outside Iran, the credibility of these assurances
is high. They are made by a group of states and com-
municated to all interested parties through an inter-
national organization (the IAEA), and so can not be
withdrawn all of a sudden by any single government.
It is suggested that the IAEA "might be invited to
monitor the operation of the mechanism and certify
its operation on objective principles?"
The Framework recognized Iran's right to de-
velop a nuclear power programme to reduce its de-
pendence on oil and gas and to choose the most ap-
propriate mix of energy sources. However, it stopped
short of offering Iran light water reactors. While art.
IV of the NPT commits supplier states to facilitate
access to technology for NNWS parties, the Frame-
work only promised "not to impede participation in
open competitive tendering"."
In addition to stopping all fuel cycle activi-
ties, reconfirming its NPT obligations and ratifying
the Additional Protocol, Iran should undertake to co-
operate proactively with the IAEA to solve all out-
standing issues "including by allowing IAEA inspec-
tors to visit any site or interview any person they
deem relevant to their monitoring of nuclear activity
in Iran". In response, Iran noted that such inspec-
tions would go beyond the Additional Protocol, and
considered this demand an intimidating infringement
on its sovereignty. 50
The Paris guidelines said the long-term agree-
ment " ...will ... provide ...firm commitments on secu-
rity issues". The offer did not do that. It merely refered
to the UN Charter and reaffirmed the security assur-
ances that France and the United Kingdom have given
together with the other veto powers, summarized in
SC Res. 984 of 1995. The E3 reaffirmed their com-
mitment to work for a zone free of weapons of mass
destruction in the Middle East, but without introduc-
ing any new element that could take that proposition
forward. As part of an overall agreement, the E3/EU
would welcome an expanded dialogue on regional
security issues. However, all of this is far from ad-
dressing Iran's security concerns in a firm manner.
Neither is it easy for the E3/EU to do so, for
the main threat to Iranian security comes from the
US. When working on the Paris agreement, the Eu-
ropeans deemed it important that the US should be
comfortable with its provisions and in the negotia-
tions that followed, they kept the US well informed.
However, far from considering any security assur-
ances for Iran, the US did military contingency plan-
ning and kept the pressure on the ayatollahs up.
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In the early stages of the negotiations, the US
made two gestures: it would no longer object to Ira-
nian negotiations for WTO membership, and it was
willing to provide spare parts for Iranian civilian air-
craft. WTO negotiations had been on the Iranian de-
mand list to the Europeans. There is a long way, how-
ever, from the start ofWTO negotiations to their suc-
cessful conclusion. There are a great many ways in
which the talks might derail. Far from meeting main
Iranian concerns, Teheran scoffed at Washington's
gestures.
However, the US offer was addressed to the
Europeans as much as to the Iranians. It conveyed a
semblance of support for the European diplomatic
endeavour while staying at a distance. Since the Ira-
nian fuel cycle activities would be suspended for as
long as the negotiations lasted, and the suspension
was defined in accurate and comprehensive terms,
diplomacy bought valuable time for the Americans.
Not knowing what to do - there was no clarity in
Washington about the proper approach to the Ira-
nian problem - buying time was a sensible strategy.
As long as the Europeans stayed committed to halt-
ing all fuel cycle works in Iran - which they did - the
talks could do no harm. They could only be helpful.
However, the US never gave them much of a chance
beyond being a holding manoeuvre.
The Framework for a Long-Term Agreement
was too little too late. At an earlier stage of the ne-
gotiations, it could have made sense as an input for
further consideration, but five days passed the 1
August deadline it had no chance of winning Iranian
acceptance. The European negotiators hardly failed
to foresee that, although they may have been sur-
prised by the strong-worded, categorical rejection.
6. The Path of Escalation
In short: August 2005 was a turning point. Iran
briskly turned the E3/EU offer down; in a comment,
President Bush ended in reference to the use offorce;
to which Chancellor Schroeder said that under no
circumstance would Germany participate in an armed
attack." In Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected
President: with him, new leaders took office, many
of them with a background in the Revolutionary
Guard. The conflict was set on a path of escalation.
The Americans used every occasion to esca-
late the conflict. More than anybody else, they framed
the discussions at the IAEA, constraining the action
space of other-governments, big and small. At the
September meeting of the IAEA Board of Gover-
nors, for the first time since the vote to refer North
Korea to the Security Council in 1993 the Board did
not move by consensus, but adopted a resolution by
majority vote referring to Iranian non-compliance
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and to a resulting absence of confidence that "give
rise to questions that are within the competence of
the Security Council"."
At the same time, the experience from Iraq
and Afghanistan proved that even the US could ben-
efit from cooperating with others and building inter-
national legitimacy for its policies. Thus, it was mind-
ful of the importance of building a broad coalition
against Iran. The conflict therefore escalated slowly
but steadily to the point where in January 2006,
Condoleeza Rice said that the time for talk had come
to an end (except for Security Council considera-
tions of punitive measures). Two months later, the
updated National Security Strategy named Iran the
single greatest threat to the United States.
In 2003, the inspection process in Iraq was
overtaken by the urge to go to war. Two years later,
the inspection process in Iran was overwhelmed by
the politics of the matter. On 4 February 2006, the
Board of Governors reported Iran to the Security:
the next day, Iran withdrew from the Additional Pro-
tocol - as it had said it would do. From then on, the
Agency's ability to look for facilities and activities
that may not have been declared has been severely
restricted. Over time, this is going to enhance uncer-
tainties about what is going on in Iran, and strengthen
the case of those who believe in punitive measures,
the use of force included.
In all of this, the provocative statements of
the new Iranian president were seen to play into the
hands of Western hawks. In the eyes of many ob-
servers, Ahmadinejad became their useful idiot.
However, those statements may also be un-
derstood in quite a different way. There were a great
many of them. Israel should be wiped off the map.
Doubts were expressed about Holocaust: did it re-
ally take place? Few questions can create such an-
ger in the Western world. Nuclear technology could
be transferred to Sudan, which has an Islamist re-
gime (but no industrial basis for a nuclear pro-
gramme). In mid-April, the President even alluded
to Iranian application of the second generation tech-
nology for enrichment (P-2), which they got from
the Khan network in the mid-90s, but which they
said they had left aside because they had their hands
full mastering first generation centrifuges (P-l). For
a long while, the whereabouts of the P-2 technology
had been a critical point in the IAEA's efforts to map
the nuclear programme, and it still is. The reactions
were predictable: aha, didn't we expect that? Don't
they have a secret, military production line based on
P-2 centrifuges? The conclusion seems obvious: far
from being useful idiots, the Iranians deliberately
escalated the conflict to the highest political levels.
Why? Ahmadinejad's predecessor, the liberal
Mohammed Khatami, tried to be forthcoming to the
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West, but to little or no avail. The new leaders were
all the more convinced that a soft line would lead
nowhere. They did not disregard the risk of war:
being part of the axis of evil the threat was obvious.
Defensive measures, including tunnels and cavities
in hard rock to keep valuable assets from being de-
stroyed, were taken. At the same time, getting on
talking terms with the US was of the essence. Only
by striking a deal with the US could their security be
much improved ifnot ensured and their relations with
the Western world normalized. They made no secret
of this. The question was one of timing.
7. Course Correction:
Playing for Time
In late winter/spring of 2006, President Bush
faced mounting problems. Iraq developed from bad
to worse; the repercussions of hurricanes Katrina and
Rita haunted him; other domestic problems also
weighed in and brought his popularity down to a his-
toricallow. While in January, public opinion seemed
supportive of bombing of Iran, confidence in the
President's hard-line Middle East policy dropped
throughout the year. As the Congressional elections
came up on the radar screen of US politics, an attack
on Iran appeared too risky for comfort. The Govern-
ment therefore settled for multilateral diplomacy in
a play for time. The Iranian issue went back and forth
between Vienna and New York and in early June,
the US even joined the E3, Russia and China in pre-
senting another incentives package to Iran, improv-
ing on the offer that the E3/EU had made in August
2005. The Iranians therefore had their strategy right:
this was. the time to bring the conflict to the highest
political levels in a bid for direct talks with the US
for at this stage, the US was not ready for military
action, but in a diplomatic mode playing for time.
More than anything else, the course correction was
due to Bush's problems at home. For Americans, the
home ground is more than half the world.
In the Framework for a Long-Term Agree-
ment, the E3/EU was more cautious about light wa-
ter reactor supplies than the wording of art. IV of the
NPT would suggest. 53 In the new offer, the P5+ 1 did
better, committing "to support actively the building
of light water reactors in Iran, in accordance with
the IAEA statute and the NPT."54On the other hand,
the security assurances remained vague, limited to
support for a new conference to promote dialogue
and cooperation on regional security issues. Moreo-
vcr, while the commitment on light water reactors is
a commitment "up front" to create the right condi-
tions for negotiations, a conference on regional se-
curity issues is an agenda item for the negotiations
on a long-term comprehensive agreement.
o' In response, Iran sought clarification on a
number of issues. It wanted finn guarantees on the
sale of light water reactors, noting that US sanctions
presently prohibit such transfers to Iran. Is the United
States ready to lift some if not all of the sanctions?
Furthermore, it sought clarification of the proposal
for a regional security conference and, also, on the
timeline of the promised economic and trade incen-
tives."
Regarding suspension of the fuel cycle ele-
ments as a precondition for negotiations, Iran stated
that everything would be negotiable - the future of
enrichment and reprocessing works included - but
that suspension of them could not be a precondition
for resumption of talks. This matter is at the core of
the conflict: Iran's failure to meet the requirements
of Security Council resolution 1696 of July 30, con-
firmed by the IAEA report on safeguards implemen-
tation of 31 August 2006, activates Council discus-
sions of appropriate measures under art. 41 of Ch.
VII of the UN Charter, i.e. sanctions."
Rather than moving straight into discussions
of sanctions, however, the EU engaged Iran in fol-
low-on talks about the P5+ 1 offer and the Iranian re-
sponse to it. China and Russia clearly preferred con-
tinued diplomacy over punitive measures. The UN
Secretary General also pleaded for more time for
talks." The United States recommended a gradual
approach to sanctions starting with travel bans and
freeze of bank accounts and extending into more se-
vere measures like trade sanctions. While keeping up
a certain pressure to escalate, not to appear inconsist-
ent, this was not a matter of urgency for the US either.
The administration seemed intent on going low and
slow ahead of the Congressional elections.
8. A Peaceful Solution?
A peaceful solution rests on US willingness to
engage Iran diplomatically, and on Iranian readiness
to go back on its fuel cycle works, become fully trans-
parent, and substitute cooperation for confrontation.
Some time ago, there were bilateral talks be-
tween the US and Iran on the situation in Afghani-
stan. Later, green light was given for talks between
the US ambassador in Baghdad, Khalilzad; and Ira-
nian counterparts. The US underlined that the talks
would be about Iraqi matters and nothing else. To be
of interest to Iran, however, their scope would have
to be enlarged. It seems that different views on fram-
ing and modalities brought the initiative to nothing.
With rare exceptions, talking with the priesthood in
Teheran has been anathema for all US governments.
However, in connection with the P5+ 1 offer,
the US said it would come to the table together with
the other five - i.e. in a format similar to the 6-power
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talks on orth Korea - ifTran met the conditions spelt
out by the IAENthe Security Council. To Iran, this
meant defeat first and talks afterwards. Instead, it
took the view that everything was negotiable, but
that there could be no preconditions. In short, the
Iranian effort to engage the US came to something,
but not to any practical results.
All things considered, the Bush administra-
tion is unlikely to sit down with the Iranians. The
tactical adjustments of2006 meant no change of strat-
egy and objectives. The administration remains ada-
mantly opposed to appeasement of its enemies, warn-
ing against any repeat of the mistakes of the 1930s.
Still, a turnaround cannot be ruled out. Should the
problems in the Middle East become ever more in-
tractable, and the President stay weak and belea-
guered and with little domestic support for military
action, a political deal with Iran may seem better than
no effective policy at all. The President has empha-
sized, repeatedly, that the worst weapons must be
kept out of the worst hands, and the neo-cons like to
be seen as men of action. Therefore, while bilateral
talks take a major change of mindset and therefore
appear improbable, it cannot be excluded.
9. Conclusion
What could a political solution be about?
Which are the parameters?
Having hidden the programme for 18 years and
having tried to mislead the IAEA through most of
2003, it takes a lot to re-establish confidence in Iran
as a non-nuclear weapon state. This has to be the
starting point. Only when the IAEA has ascertained
that there are no undeclared facilities or activities
and trust has been recreated can Iran claim the full
benefits of art. IV of the PT.58
Ideally, a solution should be sought within the
framework of the international non-proliferation re-
gime, and in such a way that it would strengthen the
regime. Iran's acceptance of the Additional Protocol
would help establish the Protocol as the new verifi-
cation norm. Acceptance of voluntary transparency
measures could set a valuable precedent for clarifi-
cation of thc nuclear history of other states which
have failed to live up to their obligations, or been
suspected of irregularities. If Iranian participation
in a multinational fuel cycle centre becomes part of
the long-term solution, this would be the first time
such a venture is set up in a proliferation-prone re-
gion." Multinational centres may be the best way to
bridge art. IV and articles IIII of the NPT, making
peaceful utilization of nuclear energy more cornpat-
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ible with the non-proliferation objective." Last not
least, if the US would extend credible security as-
surances to Iran, an important proliferation driver
would be removed and the regime would stand to
gain. On the other hand, if the preparations for mili-
tary attack continue and escalation picks up again,
Iran may leave the NPT. Unfortunately, for the time
being none of this is seriously entertained: In essence,
the matter is subject to big power politics outside
rather than inside the non-proliferation regime.
At the turn of 200512006, Russia invited Iran
to cooperate on uranium enrichment on Russian soil.
Iran, however, wanted to combine industrial-scale
enrichment in Russia with pilot-scale enrichment in
Iran, often referred to as research and development
activities. At the core of these efforts were the place
and time of enrichment. Industrial-scale enrichment
would take place in Russia, but to what extent would
Iran be involved? What would be the role ofIranian
scientists? Would pilot-scale enrichment in Iran, in-
volving only a small number of centrifuges so that
the activity would be harmless from a weapons point
of view, be agreeable? For how long or under what
circumstances would enrichment have to be done in
Russia, and when or under what conditions could
industrial-scale enrichment take place in Iran?
In terms of weapons relevance, separate work
units (SWUs) are a continuum: at the low end of it,
the amounts are militarily insignificant. For instance,
if Iran were allowed to run UF6 through one or two
cascades of 164 centrifuges and no more, the amount
would be militarily insignificant. The degree of en-
richment could be limited to no more that 5 per cent
- i.e. what is needed for reactor fuel - and the pro-
duction would be under IAEA surveillance. For the
Western powers, however. no enrichment on Iranian
soil was acceptable. Russia took the same view.
Prior to the meeting of the IAEA Governing
Board on March 6, Russia indicated that Iran might
nevertheless be allowed to do some small-scale en-
richment works, small enough to be militarily insig-
nificant. The Director General of the TAEAhad simi-
lar thoughts, realizing that in order to strike an agree-
ment with Iran, some face-saving measure would be
necessary. Germany may not have been alien to the
idea, but France and the UK were negative, and the
US rejected it out of hand. After a while, Russia said
it would not introduce such a proposal, and the E3
maintained its position not to accept any degree of
enrichment in Iran. However, the idea may be re-
vived, depending on how the conflict evolves.
In textbook logic, the Iranian crisis presents an
opportunity to follow up on the idea of the zone free
of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. A
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first step could build on former President Bush's arms
control proposal of 1991, in which he called for a
freeze on reprocessing activities in Israel. Today, a
freeze on the production of fissile materials in the
Middle East would have two main addressees: Iran
and Israel. Agreement to do this would amount to a
regional cut-off in the production of fissile materials.
If Israel could be convinced to institute a freeze in
Dimona, it would be harder for Iran to resist doing the
same. More than that, it could be turned into a diplo-
matic victory for Iran. However. Iran does not recog-
nize Israel; Israel is not ready for it; the US supports
Israel; and multilateral arms control has no important
place in the Bush administration approach to prolif-
eration problems. In the long term, textbook logic may
prove to be good political logic, but hardly in time to
help solve the Iranian problem.
There remains the possibility that in the last
instance, in the face of stiff international reactions
and the threat of use of force, Iran will back down
and accept the demands made by the IAEA and the
Security Council. To date, there are no signs that this
will happen, however.
As time goes on, the uncertainties about the
Iranian programme are growing. Iran had indicated
that by the end of2006, there would be 3000 centri-
1 Pakistani foreign minister Aga Shahi visited Khomeini shortly
after the revolution, and warned him that if he let the nuclear
programme slip it would take him a long time to build it up again.
In response, the ayatollah talked about the ouster of Mossadeq
and the LIS interference in Iran through the Shah. It was clear
that in his cosmology, there was no place for nuclear matters.
Personal communication from Aga Shahi to the author.
2 Akbar Etemad, "Iran", in Aarald Muller, ed., A European Non-
Proliferation Policy. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987.
3 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Is-
lamic Republic of Iran, GOV/2004/83 of I S November 2004; p.
16. In August 2004, Iran presented to the Agency drawings that
it had received from a foreign company in 1977 for hot cells that
were to be constructed at Esfahan.
4 The NCRI announcement was made on 14 August 2002. In
September, Iran informed the IAEA that the facilities were built
as part of a progam to develop a nuclear fuel cycle. "The Iran
Nuclear Crisis: A Chronology", Arms Control ASSOCiation, http:!
iwww.armscontrol.org/country/iran/#2002
5 In the mid-1970s, Qadeer Khan stole the P-1 technology from
URENCO, a tripartite enrichment plant at Almelo, the Nether-
lands.
6 Kalaye Electric is based in Teheran and belongs to the AECI.
7 GOV/2004/83, op.cit., p. 6. All of this according to Iran's own
reporting to the IAEA.
8 GOV/2005/67. Six instances of failure to report certain activi-
ties, mostly concerning enrichment and laser experimentation
and including the import of uranium gas from China in 1991; two
instances of failure to declare enrichment facilities; six instances
of failure to provide design information or updated design infor-
33
fuges installed at Natanz: by the end of August, it
had only come to a second cascade of 164 centri-
fuges, testing of which was due to start in Septem-
ber. This may be interpreted in many directions: tech-
nical problems; slower speed in order not to provoke
Western interlocutors and endanger the diplomatic
process; slow-down at Natanz, but intensified activ-
ity at some undeclared site(s); and lesser emphasis
on fissile material production while more resources
are devoted to non-nuclear components of nuclear
weapon systems." A recent finding of HEU parti-
cles in a waste dump fuelled suspicions. In the ab-
sence INFCIRC 540 type safeguards; worst case as-
sumptions may take hold.
The gains of bringing escalation to a halt and
of achieving a political solution can be fully assessed
only when compared with the costs of war. The costs
cannot be predicted with any precision, but they are
potentially huge, not only for the warring parties,
but for the entire region of the Middle East and for
energy prices and economic development worldwide.
Different from the case of Iraq, where realistic as-
sessments of the long-term consequences of war were
absent, much attention has been drawn to the politi-
cal implications of the use of force against Iran. The
lessons from Iraq are sobering. •
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mation for certain facilities; and a general charge of failure on
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